Abstract
Introduction
Public-key encryption scheme was first come up by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1978 [1] . It was based on public-key cryptography concept proposed by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [2] . The scheme allows communicating parties to securely share a message without having previously shared-secret key. This is accomplished by generating two related keys: public-key, which is used for encryption and publicly known to others, and private-key, which is private for the user and used for decryption. However, publickey cryptography has shown some security issues. The sender has to authenticate the public key of the receiver in real world scenario. Otherwise incorrect public keys would be used to impersonate the receiver. An effective approach to provide authentication for public keys is to have a key management system called Public-Key Infrastructure. PKI is a network of trusted entities known as certificate authority (CA) that are used to authenticate the public key of the users. CAs map users' identity with their public keys and provide other key management functionalities such as certificate generations and revocations. This approach is expensive and inefficient process for any system that employs it.
Identity-Based Cryptography
To dispense with the need for PKI, identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir [3] in 1985. The idea is to eliminate the need for certificates by utilizing digitally unique information for public keys like email address. Obviously, this approach requires a trusted third party to generate private keys for its users. It is called Private Key Generator (PKG) and it distributes a master public key mpk and holds the corresponding master secret key msk. For a user to obtain a private key, he/she first communicates with the PKG, which in turn uses its msk to create the private key to the user. Nevertheless, identity-based cryptography experiences the key escrow drawback which allows a PKG to models are used to theoretically prove whether a scheme is secure or not and provide estimation to possible attacks in practice. A certificateless scheme is alleged to be secure by providing a valid proof on its matching security game. A security game is a challenger where the adversaries try to submit queries to win this game if described conditions are met. Officially, in certificateless cryptography, the adversaries are categorized as Type I and II adversaries [5] [6] . Following subsections provide definition and information of each type.
Adversary Types
A secure certificateless scheme should counter both Type I and Type II adversaries. A Type I adversary is an outsider, not KGC nor legal user, who has the ability to selectively modify public keys of any user and may be able to get some partial private-key values but cannot disclose msk value. In other hand, a Type II adversary is a KGC which is able to view msk value but cannot change public keys of any user [24] [25].
Type I and Type II Attack Variations
There have been different attempts to specifically describe the actions involved for adversary as well as in the security model. In general, a certificateless encryption scheme is considered secure with variations of Type I adversaries if every PPT attacker has minimal advantage in winning the indistinguishable chosen ciphertext attack 2 game. A CL scheme would be secure against Type II attack variations, if every PPT attacker, with auxiliary information equals the master private key of KGC, has minimal advantage to win the INDCCA2 game. 
Adversary Power and Goals
We first define weakest adversary goals and strongest power [7] [22]  Existential forgery goal: when the adversary has the ability to generate at least one correct signature for a message that has not been signed before.
 Strong forgery goal: when the adversary has the ability to generate at least one correct but distinct signature for a message that has been signed before.
 Adaptively chosen-message attack power: when the adversary has the ability to select signed messages adaptively in the course of attack, where the signer can be used to sign messages while the attack time. Combining the previous weak adversary goals and strongest adversary power, a secure certificateless scheme is treated as (1) existentially or (2) strong existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen-message attacks. For the first scenario, the adversary goal is to get a faked signature using identity and message under the following circumstances:
1. is valid signature for identity and message
2.
has not been sent to the signing oracle any time before 3. has never been outputted.
Moreover, for the second scenario strong unforgeability, the conditions are the same except for the second one:
has been sent before
Adversaries and Oracles
Oracles are used as responses to the adversaries' requests in the security model. There are five kinds of oracles in certificateless cryptography [8] , and the access for each one is based on the security game specifications. Table 3 describes the oracles 
Survey of Proposed Protocols
In this section, we review a number of proposed schemes for certificateless public key encryption. For each scheme, we describe the algorithms, the security model and the performance. There are two types of CL-PKE scheme constructions: concrete and generic. Concrete construction of scheme is a distinct and fully described scheme while the generic one is based on and derived from other primitives.
Al-Riyami 1/Yum-Lee version CL-PKE [9]
The first scheme for (CL-PKE) was proposed by [5] . He defined nomenclature, basic notations and the first framework for CL-PKE. This scheme is considered generic and is based on PKE scheme and identity-based one. The scheme is built using elliptic curve pairings.
Algorithms:
The algorithm of the scheme comprises the following:  Initialization setup: CL-PKE scheme is initiated by KGC. This process is done once per user and outputs mpk and msk. The security parameter is the input for the process.
 Partial private key generation: This process is executed again by KGC and once per user. It takes the output of initialization setup as input as well as the identity of the user to construct a partial private key belongs to the user.
 Secret value setup: The user run this process taking mpk and ID as input to generate a secret value that is required as input for other processes.
 Private key: This process generates a private key by taking ( , mpk, ) as input. The generated private key is going to be known only for the generator.
 Public key: This process generates public key by taking as input the of the user and the mpk that is extracted in the initial setup by KGC. This is done by the user.
 Encrypt: The input for encryption process is the mpk, user's ID, and the message. It produces as an output an encrypted message that can be decrypted only by user. Note that in this version, the encrypted message is produced by first applying encryption on the message via public key scheme and then via identity scheme.
 Decrypt: The input for this process is value of the user, mpk and the encrypted message, this process can decrypt and output the original decrypted message.
Security Model:
For type I model, the scheme uses Weak Type 1b model. For type II model, the scheme uses Weak Type II model. Note that partial private key process is not accessible by the attacker. This scheme was proven insecure by [10] [11]
Al-Riyami 2 CL-PKE
A second version of the first scheme is proposed by [2] also. Again, the scheme is considered generic and is based on PKE scheme and Identity-based one. The scheme is built using elliptic curve pairings.
Algorithms:
The algorithm of the second version of the proposed scheme is almost similar to the first version. However, it's different in the following elements:
1-Encrypt: The input for encryption process is the mpk, user's ID, and the message. It returns an encrypted message that can be decrypted only by user. Note that in Al-Riyami 2 version, the encrypted message is produced by first applying encryption on the message via identity scheme and then via public key scheme.
2-Decrypt:
The decryption process in this scheme is almost identical to version 1. However, the only difference is going to be in the order of underlying operations due to the change in encryption process.
Performance
With regard to encryption process compared to other variations of this scheme, the process is done sequentially which is not efficient.
Security Model
This version of the scheme has no proof of and security models. This scheme was proven insecure by [9] 
Al-Riyami 3 CL-PKE
A third version of the first scheme is presented by Al-Riyami. The scheme is of generic type since it is based on -PKE scheme and identity-based one. The scheme is built using elliptic curve pairings.
Algorithms:
The algorithm of the third version of the proposed scheme is almost similar to the first and second versions. However, it's different in the following elements:
 Encrypt: The input for encryption process is the mpk, user's ID, and the both shares s1 and s2 of the message to be encrypted m. Where s1 + s2 = m. It outputs an encrypted message that can be decrypted only by user. Note that in Al-Riyami 3, the encrypted message is formed by applying parallel encryption on the shares of the message via identity scheme encryption and the other share via public key scheme.
 Decrypt: The decryption process in this scheme is going to be different from the other two versions since the message is split into two shares and each share is encrypted in by different schemes.
Performance:
With regard to both encryption and decryption processes compared to other variations of this scheme, the process is done in parallel which is more efficient.
Security Model:
This version of the scheme has no proof of and security models. This scheme was proven insecure by [11] .
Al-Riyami-Paterson 1 CL-PKE [5]
A concrete type scheme is presented by Al-Riyami-Paterson. The scheme is considered concrete because it is not based on primitives like identity to compute public key. The authors adapted Fujisaki-Okamoto padding technique [12] to the scheme in order to secure it against chosen cipher text attacks.
Algorithms:
The algorithms of the Al-Riyami-Paterson 1 scheme matches the basic CL-PKE scheme pointed to earlier in several elements. These elements include partial private key generation, Secret value setup, private and public keys generation. However, it's different in the following elements:  Initialization setup: The only difference in this process is that on top of what parameters required for this process in basic CL-PKE; there are two additional cryptographic hash functions needed.
 Encrypt and Decrypt:
The encryption and decryption processes in this scheme involve more steps to be applied including checking parameters and the public key structure.
Performance
The scheme includes more underlying operations in its framework. A single encryption process requires three pairing calculations. Therefore, it can be roughly concluded that it is less efficient than the previous generic schemes and also less efficient than the second Al-Riyami-Paterson 2 scheme.
Security Model
In random security model, the scheme's security was proven. The scheme uses Strong Type I for type I model and Weak Type II for type II model.
Al-Riyami-Paterson 2 CL-PKE [13] Details
Two years after Al-Riyami-Paterson 1 scheme, the authors have proposed new generic type scheme that is based on identity-based and PKE scheme. The scheme is proposed to be more efficient than the first Al-Riyami-Patersion 1 scheme and more secure.
Algorithms
Al-Riyami-Paterson 2 scheme is a result of optimizing double encryption construction that consists of both identity based encryption of [14] and ElGamal PKE scheme [15] as the main components or building blocks of the scheme. The scheme algorithm comprises the following:
The input is security parameter to generate several outputs as groups to extract spaces of allowed values for message and other parameters. Moreover, a master key is generated in this process.
 Partial private key generation: The input for this process is the user's ID and generates the .
 Secret value setup: The input for this process is the output of initialization setup as well as the ID to generate a secret value.
 Private key:
It is generated by taking as input the generated , output of initialization setup and entity's .
 Public key: It is generated using the exact same inputs of private key except the .
 Encrypt and Decrypt:
The encryption processes in this scheme involves single pair computation per encryption which is more efficient than the Al-RiyamiPatersion 1 scheme. However, the cost of decryption is similar in both versions of the scheme. The input of encryption is the user identity and the public key. For decryption, private key is needed as input for the process.
Performance
The second scheme of Al-Riyami-Paterson 2 is more efficient than the first one since single pair computation is needed for encryption process. However, the decryption process costs are similar in both versions of the scheme.
Security Model
In random security model, the scheme's security was proven by the authors. The scheme uses Strong Type I for type I model and Weak Type II for type II model. Nevertheless, the security of this scheme is broken by [11] [16][6]
Baek, Safavi-Naini and Susilo CL-PKE scheme
An improved scheme that doesn't use elliptic curve pairings in its underlying architecture was proposed in [17] . The scheme is considered a modified formulation of Al-Riyami-Paterson scheme. One of the main distinct parts in this scheme is that the public key cannot be computed before partial private key computation. This has a disadvantage of preventing future encryption of messages with a public key before the private key is obtained. In contrast, the scheme with such a formulation prevents "denial of decryption".
Algorithms
Baek scheme has five elements in its algorithms instead of seven. The reason is merging of three elements in Al-Riyami scheme into one element. In other words, private key, public key generation and secret value setup are combined into one element called user key generation. The algorithm of the suggested scheme comprises the following:  Initialization setup: This process is similar to (Al-Riyami 1) initialization setup. It is executed by KGC taking security parameter as input and generating msk, mpk and other parameters. Moreover, a master key is generated in this process.
 Partial private key generation: Same as (Al-Riyami 1) partial private key generation process. The input for this process is the user ID, msk and mpk to generate .
 Key Generation: A process that combines multiple processes in (Al-Riyami 1) scheme. The input for this process is the and the user identity to generate public and private key for users.
 Encrypt: Exactly as encryption process in (Al-Riaymi 1) scheme. Takes the , mpk and ID as input to generate an encrypted message.
 Decrypt: Different than decryption process in (Al-Riaymi 1) scheme. Takes the user private key and mpk as input to generate a decrypted message.
Performance
Compared to (Al-Riyami 1) scheme, this scheme is more efficient since it combines multiple processes of key generation into single process.
Security Model
Obviously, the scheme doesn't rely on secret value which makes Weak Type Ia security model improper. In random security model, the scheme's security was proven by the authors. The scheme uses Strong Type I for type I model and Weak Type II for type II model.
Libert-Quisquater CL-PKE scheme (concrete version)
An efficient concrete CL-PKE scheme was proposed by [11] . The scheme seems to be a newer version of Al-Riyami-Paterson scheme since the author called it "NewFullCLE". The scheme can be viewed as identity based encryption combined with ElGamal encryption.
Algorithms
Libert-Quisquater scheme has seven elements in its algorithm and it is highly similar to Al-Riyami-Paterson 2 scheme elements with little differences in some underlying operations. The elements in this scheme are initialization setup, partial private key generation, secret value setup, private key generation, public key generation, encrypt and decrypt
Performance
The scheme is comparable to Baek Scheme as the author claimed. It is more efficient than similar schemes proposed such as Shi and Li [18] .
Security Model
In random security model, the scheme's security was proven by the authors. The scheme uses Strong Type I for type I model and Weak Type II for type II model.
Libert-Quisquater CL-PKE scheme (generic version 1)
Libert-Quisquater [11] proposed secured version of Al-Riyami 1 scheme. The proposed scheme applied Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation. This technique is a modified version of the Fujisaki-Ocamoto conversion which converts IND-CPA attacks into IND-CCA ones. The modification is done by including the user/receiver ID including the public key within the input of hash functions used in the scheme algorithms.
Algorithms
This scheme is almost identical to AL-Riyami 1 scheme in terms of efficiency and how the algorithms are executed except two of them. These two algorithms are the encryption and decryption. User identity is included in the hash functions used for both encryption and decryption.
Performance
The scheme is similar Al-Riyami 1 scheme since it extends it. The encryption process compared to other generic versions of Libert-Quiquater is considered less efficient.
Security Model
In random security model, the scheme uses Strong Type I for type I model and Weak Type II for type II model.
Libert-Quisquater CL-PKE scheme (generic version 2)
Libert-Quisquater [11] proposed secured version of Al-Riyami 2 scheme. The proposed scheme also applied Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation. As mentioned earlier, the technique is a modified version of the Fujisaki-Ocamoto conversion which converts IND-CPA attacks into IND-CCA attacks. The modification is done by including the user/receiver ID including the public key within the input of hash functions used in the scheme algorithms.
Algorithms
This scheme is similar to AL-Riyami 2 scheme in terms of efficiency and how the algorithm is executed except two steps which are the encryption and decryption. User identity is included in the hash functions and used for both encryption and decryption. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented all version of CL-PKE schemes proposed by by AlRiyami, Baek, et al and Libert-Quisquater, We have given a comparative study on performance and security of the proposed scheme. From this survey, we can identify the drawbacks of various CL-PKE schemes. This help to construct an efficient and secure scheme that reduces the vulnerability.
